In 1839 increasing violations led to the sending of two
fast-sailing vessels to the African coast, and these were kept there
more or less regularly;[25] but even after the signing of the treaty of
1842 the Secretary of the Navy reports: "On the coast of Africa we have
_no_ squadron. The small appropriation of the present year was believed
to be scarcely sufficient."[26] Between 1843 and 1850 the coast squadron
varied from two to six vessels, with from thirty to ninety-eight
guns;[27] "but the force habitually and actively engaged in cruizing on
the ground frequented by slavers has probably been less by one-fourth,
if we consider the size of the ships employed and their withdrawal for
purposes of recreation and health, and the movement of the reliefs,
whose arrival does not correspond exactly with the departure of the
vessels whose term of service has expired."[28] The reports of the navy
show that in only four of the eight years mentioned was the fleet, at
the time of report, at the stipulated size of eighty guns; and at times
it was much below this, even as late as 1848, when only two vessels are
reported on duty along the African coast.[29] As the commanders
themselves acknowledged, the squadron was too small and the
cruising-ground too large to make joint cruising effective.[30]
The same story comes from the Brazil station: "Nothing effectual can be
done towards stopping the slave trade, as our squadron is at present
organized," wrote the consul at Rio Janeiro in 1847; "when it is
considered that the Brazil station extends from north of the equator to
Cape Horn on this continent, and includes a great part of Africa south
of the equator, on both sides of the Cape of Good Hope, it must be
admitted that one frigate and one brig is a very insufficient force to
protect American commerce, and repress the participation in the slave
trade by our own vessels.
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