Again with regard to the definition, if it is
made up of names and verbal forms, the same remark holds that there is
no sufficiently durable permanence in it. And there is no end to the
instances of the ambiguity from which each of the four suffers; but
the greatest of them is that which we mentioned a little earlier,
that, whereas there are two things, that which has real being, and
that which is only a quality, when the soul is seeking to know, not
the quality, but the essence, each of the four, presenting to the soul
by word and in act that which it is not seeking (i.e., the quality), a
thing open to refutation by the senses, being merely the thing
presented to the soul in each particular case whether by statement
or the act of showing, fills, one may say, every man with puzzlement
and perplexity.
Now in subjects in which, by reason of our defective education, we
have not been accustomed even to search for the truth, but are
satisfied with whatever images are presented to us, we are not held up
to ridicule by one another, the questioned by questioners, who can
pull to pieces and criticise the four things. But in subjects where we
try to compel a man to give a clear answer about the fifth, any one of
those who are capable of overthrowing an antagonist gets the better of
us, and makes the man, who gives an exposition in speech or writing or
in replies to questions, appear to most of his hearers to know nothing
of the things on which he is attempting to write or speak; for they
are sometimes not aware that it is not the mind of the writer or
speaker which is proved to be at fault, but the defective nature of
each of the four instruments.
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