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"Prepared under the direction of the United States Food Administration in co-operation with the United States Department of Agriculture and the Bureau of Education, with a preface by Herbert Hoover"


SO THE WHEAT SCARCITY IS NOT A QUESTION ONLY OF THE AMOUNT OF WHEAT
IN THE WORLD. IT IS A PROBLEM OF GETTING IT WHERE IT IS NEEDED--WHEAT
PLUS SHIPS. Not a single ship must go farther than is absolutely
necessary. A glance at the map shows why wheat for Europe should come
from North America rather than from Australia or India, or even the
Argentine. The trip from Australia is three times as long as from
North America, so it takes only one-third as many ships to carry food
to Europe from the United States as from Australia. The Argentine is
twice as far from Europe as the United States, and therefore twice
as many ships are needed to carry an equal amount of Argentine food
to Europe. If this continent could produce and save enough next year
to provide the whole of the Allied food necessities, we could save
1,500,000 tons of world shipping to be used for other purposes. EVERY
SHIP SAVED IS A SHIP BUILT TO CARRY MORE MEN AND MORE AMMUNITION TO
FRANCE.

WHEAT IN THE UNITED STATES
The United States has never had a large wheat surplus to export, and
the last few years it has had an unusually low supply to meet the
extraordinary demand. The 1916 crop was small. The 1917 crop was
only four-fifths of normal, little more than we ordinarily consume
ourselves. We entered the last harvest with our stocks of wheat and
other cereals practically exhausted. Hence to feed the Allies until
the 1918 harvest, we had to send wheat which we should ordinarily have
eaten.


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